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ABSTRACT
From a legal point of view, freedom and secrecy of the vote
are as important as transparency and verifiability of the
election. However, it is a challenge to reconcile the corre-
sponding requirements for electronic voting schemes. This
paper analyzes the link between individual verifiability on
the one hand and anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance on the other hand. We approach the issue by
analyzing remote as well as paper-based cryptographic vot-
ing schemes which make use of public bulletin boards. We
investigate to which extent the considered protocols meet
the above requirements, especially in the long term when
computational assumptions may no longer hold. We also
give ideas on how to improve the protocols in this respect.
The paper aims at providing an overview in order to support
election hosts such as companies, associations and govern-
ment agencies in selecting appropriate e-voting schemes with
respect to the priority of either freedom and secrecy of the
vote or voter-verifiability.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.1 [Software Engineering]: Requirements/Specifications;
E.3 [Data Encryption]: [Public key cryptosystems]; H.4.3
[Information Systems Applications]: Communications
Applications—Bulletin boards
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
ICEGOV2009, November 10-13, 2009, Bogota, Colombia
Copyright 2009 ACM 978-1-60558-663-2/09/11 ...$5.00.
General Terms
Security, Standardization, Theory
Keywords
Electronic Voting, Security Requirements, Verifiability, Long-
Term Anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
Regarding democratic elections, a fundamental objective
laid down in constitutional law is secrecy of the vote. It
requires that only the voter knows his voting decision and
nobody else is able to gain information about it. Moreover,
secrecy of the vote is a precondition of casting one’s vote
freely and without coercion [19]. If the voter fears that his
decision becomes public in the future, the freedom of vote
is clearly limited. Thus, secrecy of the vote should hold not
only during the election, but also in the future [25]. Still,
it is arguable whether a voter’s decision will be a matter of
interest 20 years after the election. Long-term anonymity
may, however, be a crucial point on the way to electronic
voting in parliamentary elections. For example, German
Basic Law requires the secrecy of the vote to hold forever
[28].
The legal terms of secrecy and freedom of vote have to be
translated to a more technical language if one wants to an-
alyze voting protocols with respect to these requirements.
In [25] it is stated that “the legal objectives of free and
secret elections are related to anonymity, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance of electronic voting”. Thus, voting
schemes should ensure long-term anonymity, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance. However, current electronic voting
protocols often rely on the security of underlying cryptosys-
tems, which is temporally limited: Cryptosystems that pro-
vide computational security may be broken at some point
in the future, e.g. by brute force attacks based on increased
computational power or by solving an underlying mathemat-
ical problem that is widely believed, though unproved, to be
hard.
Another fundamental objective for democratic elections
is transparency and verifiability. This was also stressed by
a recent judgement of the German Federal Constitutional
Court: The use of specific electronic voting machines in the
last federal election of the German Bundestag was ruled un-
constitutional1 because the machines did not provide a suf-
ficient level of voter-verifiability. This shows the importance
of individual verifiability for legally binding electronic elec-
tions. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for a continuous
dialog between jurists and computer scientists.
The use of bulletin boards has become a fundamental
means to ensure individual and universal verifiability in an
electronic election. However, public bulletin boards come
along with the following challenge: Anyone able to read the
bulletin board can copy the published information and store
it. Then, however, temporally limited security becomes an
issue: If, for example, encrypted votes are published next
to the voters names, an adversary can simply wait until the
encryption system is broken in the future. This compro-
mises anonymity as well as receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance in the long term. Besides public bulletin boards,
two more areas can be identified which are potentially af-
fected by this threat: The network used for data transmis-
sion and the archiving system used for retention of electronic
election data. This work focuses on bulletin boards and does
not consider these two areas. However, we take them up in
the following section.
Our paper aims at identifying relations and dependen-
cies between different levels of individual verifiability on
the one hand and anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance on the other hand. We introduce a classification
of these requirements which is comprehensible to both com-
puter scientists and jurists. Then we analyze selected re-
mote as well as paper-based cryptographic voting protocols
regarding the question to which extent they meet the con-
sidered requirements. We also give ideas on how to improve
the protocols in order to achieve a higher level of anonymity.
The result can support election hosts such as companies, as-
sociations and government agencies in selecting appropriate
voting schemes with respect to the legal priority of either
voter-verifiability or (long-term) freedom and secrecy of the
vote.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review
related work. Section 3 provides the definitions and classifi-
cations we use for our analysis of selected electronic voting
protocols in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Long-term security of e-voting and long-term anonymity
in particular has been addressed in [10, 12, 20, 25]. In [12] it
is stated that“secrecy requirements must be unconditionally
ensured regardless of ongoing technological improvements”.
Similarly, in [25] it is pointed out that “we have to take into
account that both, the computational resources as well as
the knowledge on cryptography will steadily increase in the
future.” But a voting scheme which publishes encryptions of
the votes usually relies on computational assumptions and
therefore is only computationally private [20]. As observed
in [10], electronic voting schemes often provide only compu-
tational election secrecy and do not even consider this to be
1see http://www.bverfg.de/en/press/bvg09-019en.html
questionable. However, if everlasting secrecy of the vote is to
be achieved one cannot rely on computational assumptions.
The interrelations and trade-offs between different require-
ments for electronic voting have been studied in [7, 18].
Chevallier-Mames et al. define an election scheme to be un-
conditionally anonymous if nobody learns more about the
votes than what is leaked by the tally [7]. The authors show
that one generally cannot achieve universal verifiability of
the tally and unconditional anonymity of the votes unless
all the registered voters participate in the election. Simi-
larly, it is not possible to have both universal verifiability
and receipt-freeness unless one makes strong assumptions
such as secure channels. Lambrinoudakis et al. have investi-
gated to which extent current remote voting protocols com-
ply with security requirements for electronic voting [18]. The
authors also identify interrelated and contradicting proper-
ties, e.g. individual verifiability and coercion-resistance.
Long-term retention of electronic election data has been
addressed in [9, 26]. The Council of Europe [9] recommends
that “data retained after the election or referendum period
shall be stored securely,” which is specified by providing sev-
eral copies on several mediums stored in different places.
The Common Criteria Protection Profile [26] defines a ba-
sic set of security requirements for online voting systems.
It requires that the election data which is retained cannot
be used to link the voter and his vote in plaintext or in
encrypted form. However, privacy-preserving retention of
election data is useless if the data has previously been pub-
lished on a bulletin board.
Long-term anonymity for electronic voting in open net-
works has been addressed for example in [16]. The authors
show that an attacker tapping the communication channels
is able to break anonymity in the long term, although he
cannot prove the link between the voter and his vote to
third parties in general. Juels et al. argue that anonymous
channels can be implemented in a practical way, e.g. by us-
ing public terminals for vote casting [14]. An adversary may
be able to view Internet communication but not to trace
back IP addresses to voters. However, the issue of securing
the physical communication channels in an online election is
out of the scope of this work. We consider the protocol level
rather than the physical layer and examine the election data
published on the bulletin board in light of two questions:
• To which extent can the published data be used to
compromise anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance in the long term?
• To which extent does the scheme provide individual
verifiability?
3. DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
As we strive to be understood by readers without detailed
technical knowledge such as election hosts in general, the fol-
lowing definitions are rather intuitive and informal. Formal
definitions can be found for example in [13, 14].
3.1 Bulletin Board, Ballot and Vote
A bulletin board is a public channel where data can be pub-
lished by authorized participants only and, once published,
cannot be erased or overwritten by anyone. This communi-
cation model was first presented by Benaloh et al. [8, 5] and
supports verifiability in electronic voting schemes.
In the following, a ballot denotes the message which is
issued by the voter in order to cast a vote for a specific
candidate. Hence, the ballot masks the actual vote. The
ballot could for example be an encryption of the vote.
3.2 Anonymity, Receipt-Freeness and
Coercion-Resistance
We consider an outside adversary. Depending on the con-
nection between the adversary and the voter as introduced
in [17], we distinguish the following levels of secrecy and
freedom of vote at protocol level:
Anonymity. The vote cannot be linked to the voter who
cast it. There is no communication channel between
the voter and the adversary. The adversary can only
use the information published on the bulletin board.
Receipt-Freeness. The voter cannot prove to an adver-
sary how he voted. There is a one-way communication
channel from the voter to the adversary: The voter
can send messages to the adversary, but the adversary
cannot send messages to the voter.
Coercion-Resistance. The adversary cannot coerce the
voter to vote in a particular way. There is a two-way
communication channel between the voter and the ad-
versary: Both voter and adversary can send messages
to each other.
In the scenario of anonymity, the voter does not cooperate in
order to prove his vote. In contrast, for receipt-freeness, the
channel from the voter to the adversary conveys the voter’s
willingness to cooperate with the adversary. The messages
sent can be considered as receipts. While the adversary is
passive in this setting and restricted to receiving messages
from the voter, the scenario of coercion-resistance consid-
ers an active adversary who can, for example, furnish the
voter with voting material to be used. Additionally, the ad-
versary can use the information published on the bulletin
board in both settings. Note that, as the adversary capa-
bilities are gradually amplified, coercion-resistance implies
receipt-freeness, and receipt-freeness implies anonymity.
3.3 Long-Term vs. Short-Term
For the protocols analyzed in Section 4 we investigate
whether each of the requirements defined in Section 3.2 is
met in the long term or in the short term only. We define
in the short term to be a period of up to ten years as it is
reasonable to assume that cryptographic algorithms remain
secure at least for this period of time if the underlying pa-
rameters (e.g. keylength) are chosen properly. This should
also cover the legislative period of the elected body in most
cases.
By contrast, in the long term refers to the time when 20
years or more have passed since the election was carried
out. Cryptographic primitives used e.g. for encryption will
possibly have been broken at that time.
3.4 Individual Verifiability
Individual verifiability or voter-verifiability expresses the
chance for the voter to assure himself that his vote was cor-
rectly recorded and included in the tally. We distinguish
basic and advanced individual verifiability as follows:
Basic Individual Verifiability. Each voter can verify that
his vote has been cast. Verifiability extends only to the
existence of the ballot, not to its content: The voter
can verify that his ballot is published on the bulletin
board, but there is no proof provided that the ballot
contains the vote which the voter intended to cast.
Advanced Individual Verifiability. Each voter can ver-
ify that his vote has been cast as intended. Verifiability
extends to the existence of the ballot and a proof re-
garding its content: The voter can verify that his ballot
is published on the bulletin board, and is additionally
provided with a proof that the ballot contains the vote
which the voter intended to cast.
4. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROTOCOLS
In the following we analyze remote as well as polling booth
based cryptographic voting protocols which make use of bul-
letin boards. We chose the protocol designed by Ohkubo et
al. [23] as a representative protocol using blind signatures,
the work of Juels et al. [14] for anonymous credentials, and
the Helios 2.0 scheme [2] for homomorphic encryption. Fur-
thermore, we selected Preˆt a` Voter [6] as a representative for
paper-based e-voting and Neff’s scheme [21] for electronic
voting machines.
In the following we first give a brief description of the con-
sidered protocol. Only the main features of the protocols are
provided to the extent to which they are important with re-
spect to our analysis. Then we analyze the protocols with re-
spect to anonymity, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance on
the one hand and individual verifiability on the other hand.
We also give ideas for improvements.
4.1 Notation
In the following P denotes a participant, e.g. a voter or
a tallier. Angle brackets indicate that the information en-
closed is published on the bulletin board. Apart from the
terms which are explained in the text or which are self-
explanatory, we use the following notation:
Vi voter i
IDi ID of voter i
BB bulletin board
R registration authority
T tallying authority
Cj candidate j
vi vote cast by voter i
bi ballot cast by voter i, containing the vote vi
prfP zero-knowledge proof(s) provided by P
encrP (·) encryption with P ’s public key
decrP (·) decryption with P ’s secret key
sigP (·) signature using P ’s secret signing key
verP (·) verification using P ’s public signing key
4.2 Blind Signatures: Ohkubo et al.
The protocol designed by Ohkubo et al. [23] is an im-
provement of the Fujioka et al. scheme [11] which was one
of the first voting schemes based on blind signatures and
anonymous channels.
Summary. The participants of the scheme are voters, a
trustworthy registrar, and several talliers. Each voter en-
crypts his vote using the talliers’ public key and then gets
the encryption blindly signed by the registrar. The voter
unblinds the signature and sends the encryption as well as
the signature to the bulletin board via an anonymous chan-
nel.2 The talliers check the signature, cooperatively decrypt
the votes and publish the voting results.
Setup. Let blr(·) denote a blinding procedure with random
blinding factor r and unblr(·) the corresponding unblinding
procedure. Vi encrypts the vote as xi = encrT (vi) sends the
blinded encrypted vote and his signature to R:
Vi −→ R : IDi, blr(encrT (vi)), sigVi(blr(encrT (vi)))
If the voter is eligible and has not applied for a signature
before, R signs blr(encrT (vi)) and sends it back to Vi:
R −→ Vi : di = sigR(blr(encrT (vi)))
At the end of the registration phase, R publishes the values
he obtained from the voters:
R −→ BB : 〈IDi, blr(encrT (vi)), sigVi(blr(encrT (vi)))〉 ∀i
Vi unblinds di, i.e. computes yi = sigR(encrT (vi)) and ver-
ifies R’s signature.
Voting. The voters use an anonymous channel to send their
encrypted vote furnished with R’s signature to the bulletin
board:
Vi −→ BB : 〈xi, yi〉 = 〈encrT (vi), sigR(encrT (vi))〉
Tallying. The talliers T verify R’s signature, cooperatively
decrypt the votes by computing vi = decT (xi)∀i and publish
the tally.
Analysis. Alongside the voter ID, the blinded encrypted
vote signed by the voter is published on the bulletin board.
The voter can check that the published values equal the
ones he sent to the registrar. Hence, only basic individual
verifiability is provided. Advanced individual verifiability
can be achieved as follows: Supposed that a probabilistic
encryption scheme is used, the encrypted vote is unique: As
decryption must be unambiguous, it is not possible to have
a different vote v′i 6= vi such that encrT (v′i) = encrT (vi).
Thus, the voter can recognize his vote next to his ID on the
bulletin board by unblinding blr(encrT (vi)).
The relation between the encrypted ballot xi and the vo-
ter’s identity IDi is hidden by the blind signature scheme.
Anonymity is thus maintained even if the cryptographic
primitive used for encryption is broken in the future. This
is due to the blindness property, i.e. unlinkability of ei =
blr(xi) and the signature yi of xi. The random value r en-
sures that an adversary cannot learn anything about the
signed message. This holds as long as the random blinding
factor r remains secret. Thus, the scheme offers long-term
anonymity.
The scheme is not receipt-free as the voter can reveal
both r and the randomness used for encrypting the vote,
thus providing the adversary with the means to verify that
the correct vote is contained in blr(encrT (vi)) which is pub-
lished next to the voter ID.
2Ohkubo et al. suggest that the anonymous channel is real-
ized by employing a mixnet. This changes the voting scheme
slightly as the voters use the mixnet’s public key to encrypt
the vote which was encrypted with the tallier’s key before-
hand. However, as this is not relevant to our approach, we
refer to the basic scheme.
4.3 Anonymous Credentials: Juels et al.
The scheme proposed by Juels et al. was the first one
to offer coercion-resistance in terms of protecting the voter
against forced abstention, randomization and simulation at-
tacks [14]. (This interpretation is compatible with our defini-
tion of coercion-resistance provided in Section 3.) After the
scheme was published, several proposals for improvements
followed [24, 27, 3], of which only the last one succeeds in
maintaining coercion-resistance. However, as the improve-
ments in [3] only pertain to efficiency, they are not relevant
to our approach. Thus, we stick to the original scheme.
Summary. The participants are voters, trustworthy regis-
trars, and several talliers. The scheme employs anonymous
credentials for voter authentication. They are distributed
in the registration phase via an untappable channel. The
indirect authorization by means of anonymous credentials
also allows for multiple voting: If a voter wants the vote
to be accounted, he includes his valid credential; if not, an
invalid credential is attached. The voter can hereafter vote
again, this time casting a valid vote. The resistance to co-
ercive attacks is based on the inability of the adversary to
distinguish invalid credentials from valid ones. An anony-
mous channel is required in the voting phase, to allow for
unsupervised voting in the moment the actual valid vote is
cast. A modified version of the ElGamal scheme is used for
probabilistic encryption. Hence, coercion-resistance holds
under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Setup. R verifies Vi’s eligibility, issues a credential σi over
an untappable channel and publishes its encryption next to
the voter ID:
R −→ Vi : σi
R −→ BB : 〈IDi, encrT (σi)〉
Voting. The ballot cast by Vi contains ciphertexts of both
the chosen candidate and the credential as well as a zero-
knowledge proof of validity:
Vi −→ BB : 〈bi〉 = 〈encrT (vi), encrT (σi), prfVi)〉
Tallying. In the tallying phase, ballots with invalid zero-
knowledge proofs are discarded first, yielding two lists A1
(encrypted votes) and B1 (encrypted credentials). Then,
ballots with duplicate credentials are removed, keeping only
the latest ones. Let A2 and B2 denote the corresponding
lists. In the next step the lists A2 and B2 are mixed using the
same, secret permutation, resulting in lists A3 and B3. Then
the list of valid encrypted credentials which was created in
the registration phase is mixed as well. Next, votes in list A3
which correspond to invalid credentials in B3 are eliminated
by means of blind credential checks against the list of valid
encrypted credentials which was created in the registration
phase. Finally the votes are cooperatively decrypted by T
and tallied.
Analysis. The scheme offers only basic individual veri-
fiability as the voter does not obtain a proof on the cor-
rect content of his ballot. Advanced individual verifiabil-
ity can be achieved in a similar way as for the Ohkubo et
al. scheme [23]: As a probabilistic encryption scheme is used,
both the encrypted vote and the encrypted credential are
unique. Thus, the voter can recognize his ballot on the bul-
letin board. However, this is not considered in the protocol.
The bulletin board contains the list of encrypted creden-
tials alongside the voter IDs and the list of all submitted bal-
lots consisting of encrypted vote, encrypted credential and
zero-knowledge proofs. Hence, the voter ID is linked to the
encrypted credential, and the encrypted credential is linked
to the encrypted vote. It follows that, in the long term, voter
ID and vote can be linked. It then suffices to trace the voter
ID back to the voter and anonymity is compromised. Thus,
the scheme offers only short-term anonymity. Therefore,
we propose that encrypted credentials should not be pub-
lished alongside the plaintext names of the voters. Still, both
lists, i.e. the voters’ register as well as the list of encrypted
credentials should be published for the sake of verifiability.
Hence, an improvement in terms of long-term anonymity
would be to detach the lists and scramble them already in
the registration phase in order to hide the relation between
the voter and the encrypted credential. For the voter it
would be sufficient to see the anonymized list of encrypted
credentials published on the bulletin board and obtain a
proof from the registrars that the encryption of his creden-
tial is valid and contained in this list. However, this ap-
proach cannot save receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
in the long term as the adversary learns the valid creden-
tials if the encryption is broken. Hence, he can tell whether
he has obtained a valid or a fake credential from the co-
erced voter. Only short-term coercion-resistance and
receipt-freeness is thus achieved.
4.4 Homomorphic Encryption: Helios 2.0
Helios 1.0 was one of the first web-based open-audit voting
systems [1]. After a series of upgrades, Helios 2.0 was devel-
oped and used in the election of the University President of
the Universite´ catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Belgium [2].
The two main differences between version 1.0 and 2.0 are a
distributed tallying authority and the use of homomorphic
encryption instead of a mixnet.
Summary. The participants are voters, a registration au-
thority, and several talliers. The ballot is composed of an
encryption of a yes/no vote for each candidate and a zero-
knowledge proof on the validity of the contained plaintexts.
Ballot preparation is separated from ballot casting: Anyone
can generate an encrypted ballot for a specific candidate.
Next, the correct preparation of the ballot can either be
audited, or the ballot can be cast after the voter has been
authenticated (Benaloh challenge [4]). The voting system
commits to the encrypted vote by displying a hash of the
ciphertext. If the voter (or any interested party) chooses
to audit the ballot, the ciphertext and the randomness used
for encryption is displayed, which allows for checking that
the encryption and the hash were computed correctly. If the
voter chooses to seal the ballot, he is authenticated and a
hash of the encrypted ballot is posted on the bulletin board
next to the voter ID. The voter obtains a signed hash of his
encrypted ballot. A sophisticated vote weighting according
to the voter category is carried out before tallying. We do
not consider this as it is not relevant to our analysis, for
details refer to [2].
Setup. The private tallying key is generated and stored in a
distributed way by the talliers (named “trustees” in [2].) In
registration phase, each eligible voter obtains an anonymous
ID and a password in a signed file from the registration
authority (UCL central authority).
Voting. Vi computes an Exponential ElGamal encryption of
the vote vi ∈ {0, 1} (g and G are group generators, h = gs
is the public key that corresponds to the private key s):
encrT (vi) = (xi, yi) = (g
ri , hriGvi)
The ballot is composed of the encrypted vote3 and a zero-
knowledge proof on the validity of the contained plaintexts:
bi = (encr(vi), prfVi)
If the voter decides to cast the vote and is successfully au-
thenticated, a hash of the encrypted ballot is posted to the
bulletin board next to the voter ID:
Vi −→ BB : 〈IDi, hash(bi)〉
Tallying. The talliers first check all proofs prfVi . Next, the
product of all ballot parts xi and yi is formed:
(x, y) = (
∏
i
xi,
∏
i
yi) = (g
∑
i ri , h
∑
i riG
∑
i vi)
The talliers jointly decrypt the ballots and get G
∑
i vi . The
sum of the votes is obtained by computing the discrete log-
arithm of this term, which is tractable as the exponent is
relatively small. Finally the talliers publish the sum of the
votes.
Analysis. The voting scheme provides only short-term
anonymity: If the encryption scheme and the preimage
resistance of the hash function used is broken, the vote can
be linked to the ID of the voter who cast it. It then suffices
to trace the voter ID back to the voter and anonymity is
compromised. The Helios voting system is not designed to
provide receipt-freeness or even coercion-resistance.
The voter can check that the receipt, i.e. the hash of his
encrypted vote, is correctly posted next to his ID on the
bulletin board. Individual ballots are never decrypted and
no proof is provided on the correct content of the ballots that
have been cast. Thus, in our model, only basic individual
verifiability is established. Helios does, however, provide
voter-verifiability (or “ballot casting assurance” as referred
to in [2]) by means of the Benaloh challenge. We consider
this in more detail in Section 5.
4.5 Paper Ballot: Prêt à Voter
Preˆt a` Voter [6] is an electronic voting system that uses
paper-based ballot forms. These are scanned and turned
into receipts to provide voter-verifiability while maintaining
coercion-resistance.
Summary. The participants are voters, a vote scanning de-
vice (VSD), an election authority, and several talliers. Prior
to the election the authority generates a large number of
ballot forms (significantly more than the amount of eligible
3In fact,vi is not a vote for a single candidate but rather a
series of yes/no votes for all eligible candidates. We omit
this here for simplicity of notation.
voters because of the audit process). The voter registers at
the polling station and randomly selects a ballot form which
consists of two columns: While the left column lists the can-
didates in random order, the right column is for the voter
to enter his choice and holds a random value at the bottom,
called onion. The onion contains the information necessary
for reconstructing the candidate ordering. The right column
is later separated from the left one to generate a receipt.
Setup. Each of the k members of the tallying authority T
creates two key pairs. The first key pair is used to encrypt
and later to reconstruct the candidate ordering on each bal-
lot form: The ordering is encrypted with the public keys of
the k involved tellers, yielding the onion. The second key
pair is only used for a specific audit process prior to vote
casting (cf. Section 5) and not further considered here.
Voting. Vi enters the polling booth and marks the ballot
form in the usual way. Still in the polling booth, Vi removes
the left hand strip of the ballot and shreds it. Note that the
destruction of the left column of the ballot form must be
enforced to ensure coercion-resistance. Next, the voter takes
the right hand strip and feeds it into the vote scanning device
(VSD). In case this ballot strip has not been used before, the
position of the mark is stored together with the onion on the
bottom of the strip. In addition, the VSD marks the strip as
having been used for voting and returns it to Vi who keeps
it as a receipt of the form sigV SD(encrT (vi)). Note that the
VSD does not learn Vi’s voting decision.
Tallying. Once the election has closed the VSD transmits
the stored receipts to the bulletin board:
V SD −→ BB : 〈sigV SD(encT (vi))〉
T performs an anonymizing mix and decryption on the batch
of encrypted ballot receipts and published the final tally.
Analysis. The ballot receipts which enter the tallying pro-
cess do not contain any personal information of the voter.
Encryption by T is only used to hide the candidate ordering.
Hence, the scheme provides long-term anonymity. By the
anonymizing mix and decryption on the batch of encrypted
ballots performed by T , the link between the encrypted bal-
lot receipt and the resulting decrypted vote is hidden. This
ensures receipt-freeness. However, if the primitive used for
encryption is broken, the permutation performed by each of
the talliers is revealed and the voter can use the receipt to
prove his vote. Thus, the scheme offers only short-term
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
The voter can visit the bulletin board to check that his
receipt is correctly posted and hence correctly entered into
the tallying process. However, he is not provided a proof
that the random onion belongs to the candidate order in the
left column and thus will be decrypted to the vote which the
voter intended to cast. Hence, in our model only basic in-
dividual verifiability is achieved. Preˆt a` Voter does, how-
ever, provide a different means to enhance voter-verifiability,
namely using dummy votes for audit. We refer to this in
Section 5.
4.6 DRE: Neff’s Scheme
Neff’s voting protocol [21] introduced a strong notion of
voter-verifiability for e-voting based on direct-recording elec-
tronic (DRE) voting machines. The scheme was developed
within the framework of the VoteHere voting system.4 It
allows a voter to verify that his ballot truly represents his
choice (cast-as-intended) without having to trust the DRE.
Moreover, anyone can verify that the tally was correctly
computed from the ballots on the bulletin board (counted-
as-cast).
Summary. The participants are voters, a DRE, and sev-
eral talliers. The voter first enters his choice at the DRE.
Then the DRE generates the according encrypted ballot and
commits to it. Next, the voter provides a challenge and the
DRE responds to it, thus convincing the voter that his vote
is correctly represented by the ballot. This receipt cannot be
used to prove the vote to a third party as it is based on the
temporal sequence of the actions taken by voter and DRE.
A threshold decryption system is used for tallying.
Setup. The talliers perform a distributed key generation
protocol to compute the master public key. Decryption is
only possible through the cooperation of all trustees in a
threshold decryption operation. Furthermore, the security
parameter l is determined (Neff suggests 10 ≤ l ≤ 15 [15]).
Voting. The voter enters his choice for candidate Cj into
the DRE:
Vi −→ DRE : j
Let l denote the security parameter. The DRE constructs
the encrypted ballot, the verifiable choice (VC), as a n × l
matrix consisting of ballot mark pairs (BMP). The BMPs
in the row denoting the chosen candidate have the form
encrT (bit), encrT (bit) while all other BMPs are supposed
to be of the form encrT (bit), encrT (¬bit) where bit ∈ {0, 1}.
A VC encoding a vote for candidate Cj could look as follows:
1 2 3 . . . l
C1 0 1 0 1 1 0 . . . 0 1
C2 0 1 0 1 1 0 . . . 0 1
...
...
...
...
...
Cj 1 1 0 0 0 0 . . . 1 1
...
...
...
...
...
Cn 0 1 0 1 1 0 . . . 0 1
The DRE then sends the unique ballot sequence num-
ber (BSN) as well as a hash of the VC to the voter. The
DRE also commits to the VC by providing the pledge bits
p1, . . . , pl where pk = bitj,2k−1 = bitj,2k:
DRE −→ Vi : BSN, hash(V C), p1, . . . , pl
Next, the voter chooses a challenge of l random bits c1, . . . , cl
where ck = 0 means that he wants the left part of the k-th
BMP in row j to be opened, while ck = 1 refers to the right
part.
Vi −→ DRE : c1, . . . , cl
The DRE constructs fake challenges for all unchosen can-
didates. The voter may hereafter change them in order to
4For more information see http://www.votehere.net/
evade coercion. It then proves to the voter that the cipher
text in position 2k− 1 + ck (k = 1, . . . , l) indeed decrypts to
pk. The DRE does so by providing the randomness which
was used for the probabilistic ElGamal encryption of the
respective bits. The result is an opened verifiable choice
(OVC), which corresponds to a VC with one half of each
BMP opened. The DRE sends the OVC to the bulletin
board:
DRE −→ BB : 〈OV C〉
Tallying. The talliers remove the BSN from each ballot and
process the ballots through a universally verifiable mixnet
[22]. Then they cooperatively decrypt the votes and publish
the voting results.
Analysis. If the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assump-
tion holds in the underlying group, then ElGamal encryption
is semantically secure. The DDH assumption is related to
the assumption that computing dicrete logarithms is hard.
However, this assumption is merely computational, which
means that ElGamal encryption does not provide long-term
secrecy. If ElGamal is broken, the OVC published on the
bulletin board shows the chosen candidate. As the BSN is
removed from the ballot after vote-casting, the compromised
OVC alone cannot be used to break anonymity. Hence,
Neff’s scheme provides long-term anonymity. However, if
the voter shows the receipt to an adversary, the pledge bits
and the challenge for the chosen candidate on the receipt
can be compared with the opened BMPs. The probability
that there is another voter whose receipt matches the com-
promised OVC is 1/2l ·1/2l = 1/4l. Thus, only short term
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is ensured.
The scheme provides advanced individual verifiability
as the voter obtains a proof from the DRE that the ballot
has been cast as intended. However, only basic individual
verifiability is provided if the voter chooses a basic receipt
containing only (BSN, hash(V C)) [15].
We conclude our analysis by providing an overview in
Table 1. To enhance readability we use the abbreviations
OMA+99 for Ohkubo et al. [23], JCJ05 for Juels et al. [14],
AMPQ09 for Helios 2.0 [2], CRS05 for Preˆt a` Voter [6],
and Neff04 for [21]. The improvement we suggested for
the scheme by Juels et al. is depicted by a box. As noted
in Section 3.2, coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness,
and receipt-freeness implies anonymity. Hence, a proto-
col which achieves short-/long-term coercion-resistance pro-
vides also short-/long-term receipt-freeness, and a proto-
col which achieves short-/long-term receipt-freeness provides
short-/long-term anonymity as well.
5. CONCLUSION
It is a challenge for current voting schemes to reconcile
secrecy and verifiability, particularly in the long term: How
can individual verifibility be achieved without sacrificing
anonymity and receipt-freeness or even coercion-resistance
in the long term? While for parliamentary elections we
should strive for the optimum, i.e. advanced individual ver-
ifiability and coercion-resistance in the long term, one could
make concessions for elections of less importance.
We introduced an intuitive classification of anonymity,
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance as well as individ-
Individual verifiability
Basic Advanced
A
ST AMPQ09 ST
LT OMA+99, JCJ05 , CRS05 LT Neff04
RF
ST ST
LT LT
CR
ST JCJ05, CRS05 ST Neff04
LT LT
Table 1: Rating of the voting protocols. A: anonymity, RF:
receipt-freeness, CR: coercion-resistance; ST: short-term,
LT: long-term.
ual verifiability. As we believe that an effective dialog be-
tween computer scientists and jurists is a precondition for
developing secure electronic voting schemes, our definitions
were determined to be understandable to both sides. We
analyzed representative remote as well as paper-based elec-
tronic voting protocols with respect to these requirements.
We also provided improvements on the scheme by Juels et
al. [14] with respect to long-term anonymity. Our protocol
ratings can support election hosts in selecting appropriate
voting schemes with respect to the priority of either freedom
and secrecy of the vote or voter-verifiability.
A novel approach in order to reconcile anonymity and ver-
ifiability for the voter is the possibility of indirect auditing
as proposed for Helios [1, 2] and Preˆt a` Voter [6]. With
Preˆt a` Voter, each voter can cast dummy votes before the
election opens in order to check on the correct construction
of the ballot forms. The talliers return the decryption of
the vote, thus proving that the candidate ordering on the
ballot form is correctly captured by the onion. This leaves
the voter confident that his actual vote will be cast as in-
tended, too. With Helios, an even stronger form of indirect
audit is provided: When the voting system commits to the
encrypted ballot, it does not know whether the voter will
choose to cast or to audit the ballot. Thus, fraud will be
detected with high probability.
At present it seems to be impossible to achieve both ad-
vanced individual verifiability and coercion-resistance in the
long term. This is also due to the fact that individual verifi-
ability is still largely understood as the ability for the voter
to check his own vote. It is to be considered whether the
notion of individual verifiability should be extended to the
indirect form provided for example by Helios or Preˆt a` Voter.
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